In the U.S. Army, the job of a battalion or brigade commander is to compel a group of human beings to resist their natural urge toward survival and self-preservation in the name of protecting the nation’s security at the precise moment of crisis — to compel their subordinates to lay down their lives for another.
To lead in the pitch of battle, the Army needs commanders who meet the highest standards. The Command Assessment Program (CAP) — developed during the first Trump administration — was always about these standards. First applied to battalion command selection at the O-5 (lieutenant colonel) level through the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP), CAP expanded to assess and select brigade commanders at the O-6 level (CCAP) and later expanded to the enlisted ranks through the Sergeant Major Assessment Program (SMAP).
The minimum requirements for commanders who excel as individual performers are peak physical fitness, basic branch proficiency and a proven track record of performance at every prior echelon. The Army produces more of these individuals every year than it has command billets to fill. And so, the Army must not only identify those who have a proven track record of individual performance — that’s table stakes — it must also cull and winnow the list of officers with the additional capabilities to lead the soldiers under their charge in the heat of battle.
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To make those tough leadership choices, the Army must identify those individuals with the knowledge, skills, behaviors and other attributes that make them fit for command. It’s simply not enough to be an exceptional individual performer: Commanders (and their sergeants major) need to be a step above in mastering human performance, not only their own, but the hundreds or thousands of soldiers under their command. To be entrusted with command, the Army needs to know more about those being considered. In addition to their PT scores and performance records, how well do these officers and NCOs communicate? What is their level of emotional intelligence? Do they have a stellar reputation among their superiors, but demonstrate untrustworthy behavior among their peers, or kick down on their subordinates? Does this officer or NCO demonstrate leadership in word and deed? Have they mastered their own self-discipline such that they compel those around them to do the same? Would you trust your life to this officer’s ability to lead in combat?
Given those weighty and consequential questions, it is only fitting that the minds behind the development of CAP were themselves the epitome of talent management done right; that is, the placement of the right individuals with the precise combination of knowledge, skills, abilities, experience and other attributes to develop such a program. The concept for CAP — developed during the first Trump administration — benefited from the guidance, input and oversight from the foremost scholar and practitioner on military talent management who wrote the book on Army talent management. Casey Wardynski was appointed by President Donald Trump as the assistant secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, or ASA (M&RA), in the first Trump administration. Trump’s appointment of Wardynski as the ASA (M&RA) — a 30-year Army officer who later went on to run for Congress as a Republican candidate on an America First platform — was an inspired choice. CAP’s genesis relies on his own rigorous body of work.
Perhaps an even more difficult audience to win over, CAP was further embraced by uniformed leadership among those who went on to positions of increasing authority. Writing publicly about the program’s early successes, then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. James McConville and then-Director of the Army Talent Management Task Force Maj. Gen. J.P. McGee articulated:
“Battalion commanders are arguably the most consequential leaders in the Army. Their experience, placement, and influence give them an out-sized ability to shape the future service of the soldiers they lead. … They will one day lead the Army and make decisions that directly impact American national security.
“No longer will we spend weeks selecting a private for the Ranger Regiment while spending an average of two minutes to select battalion commanders. We can and will do better.”
What makes these observations all the more remarkable is the battle-hardened experience, expertise and career paths of the two men writing the piece. Prior to serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army, McConville had served as the Army’s G-1 — the uniformed counterpart to the ASA (M&RA), responsible for military personnel, directly responsible for delivering the trusted, lethal and ready forces that comprise the most valuable contribution to the nation’s security that the Army has: its people. For his part, McGee — who before his assignment as the director of the Army Talent Management Task Force had commanded in the Army’s most storied units, the 82nd Airborne and the 75th Ranger Regiment — went on to earn his third star and serve as the commanding general of the 101st Airborne. This wasn’t an Army leader with his head in the ivory tower; he was a leader with a deep, battle-tested, visceral knowledge of the demands of command — and what the Army needs of its commanders.
Addressing the administration’s concerns that CAP was intended as an effort at expanding diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programming, the administration can look to the program’s own handling of a high-level case to see that DEI is not the program’s focus. There was one notable attempt by a four-star general to inappropriately influence a subordinate’s command assessment board based on the candidate’s race and gender. And what that experience demonstrated was that CAP functioned as it should have: The general officer was suspended and then fired by President Joe Biden’s Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth. The colonel in charge of CAP appropriately recorded the series of incidents in a formal memo. The subordinate candidate was removed by the Secretary of the Army command selection list. If anything, the incident provided a public case study of the program’s ability to remain transparent and fair. What’s more, the details of this specific case emphasize the program’s protection from intervention by those in positions of authority based on race or gender. If the program were intended to reinforce efforts at diversity, equity and inclusion, we would have seen a vastly different outcome to the incident.
The administration has every right to change policy as it sees fit. But characterizing the program as a Biden-era, woke attempt at DEI is counterproductive. Some of Trump’s best minds played a critical role in its formation. The program reinforced the core principles the Army is pursuing: lethality and meritocracy. CAP is a tool that could be modified to suit the administration’s priorities, and could in fact be used to reinforce the exact attributes the Pentagon’s senior appointees want from the force, and those who lead it.
Katherine Kuzminski is the director of studies at the Center for a New American Security.
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